To conclude, the law of evidence in major legal systems (i.e. common law, civil law or in countries with mixed legal systems) is the body of legislation that has been developed or enacted to govern. It can be seen that in addition to the Evidence Act of 1872, there are provisions relating to testimony in various other places. For example, Regulation No. 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the taking of evidence or local investigation The Civil Court is empowered to seek information. The holistic nature of evidence-based thinking, as revealed by these studies, has inspired alternative theories of a non-mathematical nature. An alternative already mentioned is the theory of “relative plausibility” or “relative” advocated by Allen with Pardo and others (Allen 1986, 1991, 1994; Pardo, 2000; Allen and Leiter, 2001; Allen and Jehl, 2003; Pardo and Allen, 2008; Allen and Pardo, 2019; cf. Nance 2001, Friedman 2001).  They assert that the investigators do not argue in the manner described by the Bayesian model. Instead, they commit to generating explanations or hypotheses about the available evidence through an abductive reasoning process, or drawing “conclusions to the best explanation,” and these competing explanations or hypotheses are compared in light of the evidence.  The comparison does not refer to a hypothesis with the negation of this hypothesis, which compares the probability of a hypothesis to the probability of its negation. Instead, a hypothesis is compared to one or more specific alternative hypotheses advocated by a party or put forward by the investigator himself.
In this approach, the plausibility of X, the factual account of the case establishing the guilt of the accused or the responsibility of the accused, is compared to the plausibility of hypothesis Y, another specific representation indicating the innocence of the accused or the lack of responsibility of the accused, and there may be more than one other specific account. One possible answer to the above challenge of probability ratio relevance theory is to deny that it was ever conceived as an exclusive relevance test. The evidence is relevant when the probability ratio is not 1:1. However, evidence may also be relevant for other reasons, for example: if it provides a richer narrative or helps the court understand other evidence. For these reasons, witnesses are routinely allowed to give their names, and parties may present diagrams, diagrams and floor plans (so-called “demonstrative evidence”) at trial (McCormick 2013:995). The admission of evidence in the scenario described by Allen above has been explained in the same way (Park et al. 2010:16). Some authors have suggested quantifiable ways to select or assist in selecting the appropriate reference class. On proposal, the court does not have to look for the optimal reference class. A general feature of an adversarial procedural system is that the judge plays a passive role; It is for the parties to put forward the arguments they wish to raise and to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims. This contradictory attitude makes the problem of reference classes more manageable, since the court only has to decide which of the reference classes cited by the parties should be preferred. And this can be achieved by applying one of the various technical criteria that statisticians have developed to compare and select statistical models (Cheng 2009).
Another suggestion is to use the statistical method of “characteristic selection” instead. The ideal reference class is defined by the intersection of all relevant characteristics of the case, and a characteristic is relevant if it correlates with the subject matter of the investigation (Franklin 2010, 2011:559-561). For example, if it is reasonable to assume that the amount of drugs that may be smuggled corresponds to the airport through which they are smuggling, the country of origin and the time period, and there is no evidence that any other characteristic for which data are available is relevant, the ideal reference class is the class of drug traffickers transiting through that airport and originating in and during that country. Both proposals have admitted limitations: they depend in particular on the availability of appropriate data. As Franklin points out, while statistical methods “provide guidance on how courts should judge quantitative evidence,” they do so “in a way that complements normal intuitive legal reasoning rather than replacing it with a formula” (Franklin 2010: 22). The title of the course is the law of evidence. This means not only the rules of validity or otherwise of a certain information, but also questions such as: What happens if there is no evidence on a certain point? How much evidence, if any, must a party provide to prevent a court from ruling against it on the basis of a factual allegation? What are the judge`s roles in evaluating evidence and other follow-up elements? To that end, Robert Arthur Melin [hereinafter referred to as Melin] attempted to define the law of evidence more completely. He defined it as follows. Sixth, research in experimental psychology suggests that investigators do not evaluate evidence individually and in the unidirectional manner required by the mathematical model (Amaya 2015: 114-5).
Instead, a holistic approach is pursued, in which discrete evidence is integrated into large cognitive structures (distinct as “mental models,” “stories,” “narratives,” and “theories of the case”) and evaluated globally against the legal definition of the crime or civil suit at issue (Pennington and Hastie, 1991, 1993; Pardo, 2000). Reasoning does not move linearly from reasoning to conclusion; It is bidirectional, forward and backward: since the investigator`s review of the evidence tends to make a particular judgment, his inclination towards this conclusion will often lead to a revision of his initial perception and evaluation of the evidence (Simon 2004, 2011). Bentham has long defended a utilitarian theory that the best way to arrive at the truth is to apply “gratuitous evidence.” He was of the view that a judge could be trusted to render a factually correct judgment, provided that all relevant evidence was presented. In his view, too many rules of evidence and procedure lead to the exclusion of too much relevant evidence, which reduces the search for a factually correct truth. Therefore, he advocated the abolition of all laws that exclude evidence. Recognizing the need for certain restrictions, Bentham believed that evidentiary laws were necessary only to the extent that they should prevent “trouble, cost, or delay” and not prevent the judge from discovering the truth of things by various tactics and approaches. It may seem obvious that there must be a legal concept of proof different from the ordinary notion of evidence. After all, there are many special rules in the law about what can and cannot be presented as evidence in court, how evidence must be presented and for what purpose it can be used, about the strength or sufficiency of the evidence required to present evidence, and so on. But the law is silent on some crucial issues.
To decide factual disputes in court, jury or at a hearing, the judge must rely on extrajudicial principles. There have been academic attempts at systematic analysis of the functioning of these principles in the legal investigation of facts (Wigmore 1937; Anderson, Schum & Twining, 2009). These principles, it is argued, are general in nature. Since the logic of “drawing conclusions from evidence to test hypotheses and justify conclusions” is governed by the same principles in different disciplines (Twining and Hampsher-Monk 2003:4), ambitious projects have been undertaken to develop an interdisciplinary framework for evidence analysis (Schum 1994) and to build an interdisciplinary “integrated science of evidence” (Dawid, Twining and Vasilaki, 2011; cf. Trollers, 2008). All U.S. law schools offer a course in evidence, and most require the subject either in first class, as a graduate school, or as a prerequisite for later courses. In addition, evidence from the Multistate Bar Examination (MBE) will be heavily tested – about one-sixth of the questions asked in this test will be within the range of evidence. The MBE reviews evidence primarily under federal rules of evidence and pays little attention to issues where state law is likely to be inconsistent.
The customary law of the Mughal period abolished the customary law of the Mughal period due to the gradual introduction of British law in India instead of the legal system of the Mughal period. In systems of evidence based on the English common law tradition, almost all evidence must be sponsored by a witness who has sworn or solemnly confirmed to tell the truth. Most of the law of evidence governs the types of evidence that may be required of witnesses and the manner in which the examination of witnesses is conducted, for example during direct examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Other types of rules of evidence set standards of persuasion (e.g. Probably reasonable evidence) that a factual judge – whether a judge or a jury – must use when evaluating the evidence. Moreover, especially in criminal cases, the law of evidence protects, for example, the right of the accused to a trial by containing numerous rules that exclude potentially relevant evidence, such as the general rule that evidence of the personality of the accused and previous convictions are not admitted at trial (see article 138 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and rule 145 of the DER).